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FOREWORD 
House Joint Resolution No. 1030, 1964 regular session, 
directed the Legislative Council to appoint a committee from the 
membership of the two standing education committees "to review the 
program of advance refunding of bonds in the school districts of this 
state, as well as the general practice of the sale of all schobl 
bonds." 
The following committee was appointed to carry out this and 
other studies on educational matters: Representative Ruth B. Clark, 
chairman; Senator Fay DeBerard, vice chairman; Senators Richard F. 
Hobbs, Roy H. McVicker, and L. T. Skiffington;' and Representatives 
Palmer Burch, Forrest Burns, John L. Kane, Kathleen Littler, John 
Mackie, John Orcutt, Clarence Quinlan, William Stevens, and C. P. 
(Doc) Lamb, chairman of the Legislative Council. 
The committee wishes to thank the following people who were 
so helpful in the conduct of this study: Dr. Elbie Gann, State 
Department of Education; Messrs. Fred Wiesner, Bruce Newman, Harry 
Lewis and Richard Burkhardt, Boettcher and Company; Mr. Robert 
Kirchner, Kirchner and Company; Mr. Robert Gerwin, Coughlin and 
Company, Inc.; Mr. Walter Imhoff, Hanifen, Imhoff, and Samford, Inc.; 
Mr. w. A. Conklin, Bosworth, Sullivan and Company, Inc.; Mr. Frank 
Hays, Attorney. 
Mr. Fitzhugh Carmichael had the primary staff responsibility 
for the work of this committee. 
November 24, 1964 
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Lyle C. Kyle 
Director 
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COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Colorado General Assembly, in its 1963 session, adopted 
legislation which permitted school districts to refinance their debts 
prior to maturity in order to bring about a saving on interest charges 
which was made possible by a changing money market -- among other 
reasons -- and this procedure is called advance refunding. 
The enabling legislation for advance refunding was sponsored 
by the bond houses in Colorado and was backed by various school 
boards and school administrators. 
Between adjournment of the 1963 session and the convening of 
the 1964 session of the General Assembly approximately $75,000,000 of 
outstanding school debt was advance refunded. 
The school districts of Colorado normally market approximately 
$35,000,000 of school bonds per year. Prior to passage of the enabling 
legislation on advance refunding the bond houses in Colorado estimated 
a refunding potential of approximately $100,000,000 in school bonds. 
Recognizing that this amount, roughly three times the normal 
bond activity in a year, might cause marketing problems,the bond houses 
of Colorado joined together in a syndicate for the expressed purpose 
of providing an orderly procedure for marketing advance refunding 
bonds. This was a unilateral action on the part of the bond houses 
taken without consultation with school boards, school administrators, 
the department of education, or the State Board of Education. Since 
the Colorado School Board Association, the Colorado School Adminis-
trators Association, the State Department of Education and the State 
Board of Education, all maintain offices readily available, it appears 
to the committee that the unilateral action of the bond houses in this 
instance represents an apparent disregard for those groups who repre-
sent the taxpayers of this state, and who had a greater stake in 
advance refunding than did the bond houses. 
The committee recognizes that the volume of financing involved 
in a relatively short period of time necessitated, from a good business 
standpoint, that an orderly procedure of marketing the bonds be de-
vised. However, when a school board contacted Colorado bond houses 
other than the one with which it was negotiating, only to find all 
Colorado bond houses involved in one syndicate, it left the members 
perplexed as well as doubtful of the motive of the syndicate. Hind-
sight is always better than foresight but this committee has confidence 
that our local school boards would have cooperated in establishing an 
orderly marketing procedure, whether the one adopted by the bond houses 
or an alternative procedure, as well as the other groups mentioned, had 
they been .given an opportunity to do so. 
The original legislation authorizing advance refunding of 
school bonds did not limit the number of times a school district could 
refund its debt. However, in the 1964 session of the General Assembly, 
amendments were offered and adopted to limit refundings to one time 
only. The bond houses split ranks on these amendments -- most support-
ing the proposals and a few vigorously opposing them. 
xiii 
Numerous charges and innuendoes accompanied this disagreement 
and then tended to create misunderstandings among school officials and 
legislators. As a result H.J.R. 1030 included a directive to the 
Legislative Council that it appoint a committee" ••• to review the pro-
gram of advance refunding of bonds in the school districts of this 
state, as well as the general practice of the sale of all school 
bonds." 
Questions considered by the committee in the conduct of this 
study,together with comments and recommendations, are presented below: 
1. Have the school districts of this state received the best 
interest rate possible on original bond issues as well as advance 
refunding issues? 
The committee has been unable to answer this 
more, it is doubtful that the answer can be obtained 
expert legal and financial counsel to audit each and 
whether original or advance refunding, authorized by 
in the state. 
question; further-
short of hiring 
every bond issue, 
each school board 
The committee has considerable information on the interest 
rates, savings to school districts and income to bond houses concerning 
advance refunding issues authorized in the past 18 months. 
During the 1964 session of the General Assembly there were 
rumors circulating in the legislative halls that bond houses had made 
unreasonable profits from advance refunding issues. One such rumor 
was that bond houses had made two dollars for each dollar saved the 
school districts. As can be noted from the accompanying research 
report this was not the case. The average saving to the school dis-
tricts per $1,000 advance refunding bond was $50.20 as opposed to an 
income figure to the bond houses of $15.91 per $1,000 bond. These 
figures apply to the period preceding March, 1964 during which the 
several bond houses joined together in a syndicate for the purpose of 
marketing the advance refunding issues. Comparable figures for the 
period since March, 1964 for advance refunding issues handled by 
Boettcher & Co. were $77.09 saving per $1,000 bond and $22.39 income 
to the bond houses. 
2. Should competitive public bidding be required by statute 
for all original school bond issues? 
No. The committee does not feel that competitive bidding should 
be compulsory. We are jn favor of competitive procedures for nearly 
all original school bond issues, but we feel that local boards of edu-
cation should be free to sell bonds by negotiation in cases where there 
is good reason why competitive public bidding is not desirable. 
The committee wishes to encourage the use of competitive public 
bidding as a general practice among school districts, however. It has 
been our feeling that one of the reasons advance refunding has been 
quite successful in Colorado, as opposed to other states which have 
authorized advance refunding, is that interest rates on original bond 
issues may have been higher than necessary. As indicated in the response 
to question number one the committee has no definite proof that interest 
rates have not been the best available; nevertheless, competitive public 
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bidding on original bond issues will definitely demonstrate to the 
general taxpaying public that every effort was made to obtain the best 
interest rate possible. 
Often local boards of education are not as well infor,aed about 
the financial details of their bond issues and the bond market as the 
representatives of the bond houses with whom they deal. Because it is 
difficult for the boards of smaller school districts to supply ~hem-
selves with such technical information, they tend to rely on the bond 
house representatives. The lack of an independent source of information 
may place school districts at a disadvantage in their dealings with 
the bond houses. A similar situation exists for the governing bodies 
of all types of local governmental units which issue bonds. 
The committee recommends that the General Assembly consider 
the possibility of employing an expert at the state level who could give 
assistance and advice to school districts and other local units of 
government on the sale of bonds. We feel that a qualified consulting 
staff at the state level could provide a valuable service for all types 
of local districts. If such an office were established, school districts 
and other types of districts would no longer have to depend on the bond 
houses for their information. They would have their own financial 
advisor whose sole concern would be what is best for the district. 
3. Should school districts be permitted to advance refund 
bonds? 
Yes. The committee believes · there are numerous objectives, in 
addition to interest savings for taxpayers, that can be accomplished 
through advance refunding; therefore, we recommend no change in exist-
ing law concerning advance refunding. 
4. Should competitive public bidding be required by statute 
for all advance refunding school bonds? 
Saving on interest payments is not the only reason for advance 
refunding of bonds. Debt consolidation, shortening of the term of 
debt, and relief from debt restrictions are all laudable objectives of 
advance refundings. 
Most school districts do not have available on their staffs 
the technical competence to work out the objectives and details of 
advance refundings. Consequently, outside help must be secured either 
through the retention of a fiscal agent on a consulting basis or 
through negotiation with a bond house. 
Because of the scarcity of fiscal agents available on a con-
sultative basis and also because the committee recognizes that the 
profit motive encourages bond houses to explore various means of saving 
money for school districts, we do not recommend competitive bidding on a 
compulsory basis in the instance of advance refunding. 
5. Should school districts be permitted to advance refund 
bond issues more than one time? 
No. As indicated earlier in this report this specific question 
is apparently the major cause of this study. Some people in the bond 
house business charged that the reason Chapter 237, 1963 Session Laws 
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of Colorado was amended in the 1964 session to prohibit more than one 
advance refunding, was to cover up excessive profits the bond houses 
made on the first time advance refundings. 
The committee has explored this charge thoroughly and finds it 
without foundation. As indicated in the research portion of this re-
port concerning thre~ successive theoretical advance refundings for 
the Rangely School Dtstrict it is very apparent that additional savings 
can be accomplished by successive refundings. Also, a careful study 
of that example, as well as others, will demonstrate why the interast 
rate that is peculiar to the fourth refunding issue could not be 
achieved in the first advance refunding issue. 
6. Did the existence of the bond house syndicate for the 
period of approximately one year prior to March, 1964 restrict compe-
tition in the marketing of advance refunding issues? 
Sufficient evidence has been presented to the committee to 
indicate that the existence of the syndicate did not absolutely prevent 
competition. There were individual refundings that occurred during 
the existence of the syndicate where competition from firms other than 
the ones in the syndicate was achieved. 
However, it appears to the committee that the existence of 
the syndicate tended to make it extremely difficult for school dis-
tricts to secure competitive bids when such were desired. 
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SCHOOL BONDING PRACTICES IN COLORADO 
To support the foregoing recommendations, results of research 
by the Legislative Council staff and related materials are presented 
under headings as follows: Advance Refunding of School Bonds in 
Colorado, Steps Involved in the Advance Refunding of School Bonds in 
Colorado by Negotiation, Advance Refunding of Colorado School Bonds 
Before and After Dissolution of the Colorado Account, Statutory 
Provisions, and Practices With Respect to the Sale and Advance Refu'nd-
ing of School Bonds in States of the United States, Notes Based Upon 
"Public Sale Versus Negotiation in the Marketing of Municipal Bonds, 11 · 
and Aspects of the Decision of Colorado Municipal Dealers to Syndicate 
General Obligation Advance Refunding Bond Issues, the latter being 
a letter from Fred Wiesner, Manager of the Bond Department of Boettcher 
and Company, to Lyle C. Kyle, Director of the Colorado Legislative 
Council. 
Advance Refunding of S9h9ol Bonds in Colorado 
The Colorado General Assembly in 1963 authorized school districts 
~o refund school bonds, spelling out in some detail conditions under 
which this may be done. Because the law provides for the refunding of 
school bonds if same are callable or redeemable within ten years after 
the date of issuance of the refunding bonds, refunding is permissible 
in Colorado long before the bonds of original issue can be redeemed. 
Such refunding is commonly called "advance refunding." Using the term 
in this sense, the purpose here is to examine some of the concepts, 
basic considerations, and problems involved in advance refunding. 
Specifically, this section of the report is concerned with (1) the 
?dvance r~funding ~oncept as applied to.Colorado school bonds, includ-
ing {for 1llustrat1ve purposes) an examination of what could be · 
accomplished through successive advance refundings of the Rangely 
School District bonds if such refundings were Rermissible, (2) purposes 
for which school bonds are advance refunded, (3) possible consequences 
of extensive advance refundings, and (4) appraising the fairness of a 
refunding agreement. 
The Advance Refunding Concept as Applied to Colorado School Bonds 
The refunding of school bonds is analagous to the refinancing 
of any bonded indebtedness. For any of a number of reasons it may be 
to the debtor's advantage to liquidate the existing debt and replace 
it by one in which the objectionable features have been ameliorated 
or eliminated. A common reason for refinancing, in general, is that a 
change of some kind -- in the money market, for example -- has taken 
place making it possible to borrow money at a lower interest rate than 
that of the existing debt. Under these conditions -- assuming calla-
bility of the bonds of original issue -- it may be and frequently is 
sound management to issue refinancing or refunding bonds and use the 
proceeds to retire the original issue • 
. Because of the tax-free status of school bonds, it becomes 
additionally desirable (from the point of view of the taxpayer in the 
school district in question) to advance refund school bonds. This is 
true in accordance with Colorado law (123-12-7), as will be illustrated 
in following paragraphs. The total bond interest and/or the principal 
amount of the debt may be reduced. substantially by use of the advance 
refunding device. 
The proceeds from refunding are drawn upon to purchase direct 
Obligations of the U.S. Treasury; and such purchases are made in 
sufficient amounts and according to a pre-computed schedule synchro-
nized to pay the principal of and the interest on the bonds being 
refunded, as well as any required prior redemption premiums. When the 
advance refunding transaction involving Colorado school bonds is com-
plete, all of the required government obligations are placed in an 
irrevocable trust (escrow) in a bank in Colorado possessing trust 
powers and FDIC membership. 
There is no speculation in this trust; it is composed of !lQ.!l=. 
callable treasury obligations only; and the trustee cannot sell any 
of these treasury obligations ahead of maturity. Idle cash balances 
may be invested by the trustee in Treasury Bills so long as maturity 
of same is such as to satisfy payment of the refunded issues. Income 
derived from reinvestment by the trustee, if any, accrues to the 
benefit of the school district at the termination of the escrow. It 
is further provided that, with the escrow provisions met, the refunded 
bonds "shall not be deemed outstanding bonds" so far as bonded indebt-
edness is concerned. Moreover, because of the provision with respect 
to callability or redeemability noted above, the School Board has 
freedom to choose an opportune time for entering into a refunding· 
agreement. 
To illustrate what can be accomplished by refunding operations, 
facts pertaining to the actual advance refunding of a $2,380,000 debt 
of Rangely School District No. RE-4, Rio Blanco County, are presented, 
together with similar information on three hypothetical successive 
advance refundings of the Rangely School District bonds. 
The bonds of original issue bore an interest rate of 4~ on 
all maturities. Because this is higher than the yield rate on U.S. 
Treasury obligations, the cost of the governments for escrow purposes 
necessarily exceeded the principal amount of the bonds, $2,380,000. 
The total cost of the governments in this instance, including a 
financing fee of $2,887.50,was $2,491,096.01. Since the School Board 
did not provide funds to offset the so-called escrow loss or loss on 
governments which resulted, said loss of $111,096.01 had to be met by 
selling the refunding bonds at premiums; and this is true because the 
principal amount of tha refunding issue, by law, cannot exceed the 
principal amount of the bonds of original issue. Thus, the refunding 
bonds necessarily bore higher interest rates than would normally be 
required by the School District so that the underwriters could realize 
sufficient gross income to offset the escrow loss.l 
1. Under conditions different from those which existed in the Rangely 
refunding operation, there may be a so-called escrow gain or gain 
on the governments rather than a loss. If the interest rates on 
the bonds to be refunded are lower on an average than the yield 
rates at which governments for like maturities can be bought, the 
cost of the governments for escrow purposes will be less than the 
principal amount of the bonds to be refunded. This difference is 
called an escrow gain or gain on the governments. 
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Despite the sizable escrow loss on the actual refunding of the 
Rangely school bonds, the average bond interest rate on the refunding 
issue was 4.17%, a reduction from 4.50% on the bonds of original issue. 
The principal amount of this refunding issue was the same as that of 
the original issue, but the required bond interest payments were de-
creased by $116,825. 
Details of the hy~othetical illustration are set forth in 
Tables I and II (pp. 5-7); they pertain to three consecutive 
hypothetical refundings of the actual refunding issue dated May 1, 
1963, of Rangely School District bonds having a principal amount of 
$2,380,000. With reference to Table II particularly, note should be 
taken of the conditions or assumptions underlying the analysis leading 
to its preparation. Important among them are the following: (1) all 
government bonds are priced -- for the hypothetical refunding analyses--
as of August 16, 1963, the date of closing of the actual refunding, 
(2) the offering scales or yields for all hypothetical refundings are 
the same as those for the actual refunding, and (3) the three different 
hypothetical refundings have the same maturity schedules as the actual 
refunding, except that there is a reduction of $49,000 in principal 
in the final maturity in the last of these refundings. 
A further assumption is implicit in the analysis, namely, that 
the market for Rangely School District bonqs would not be impaired by 
the successive refundings. Upon completion of what corresponds to the 
third hypothetical refunding -- four refundings in all -- the Rangely 
School bonds in the hands of investors would be increased by approxi-
mately 9~ million dollars. Whether the market would absorb this 
increase without an increase in the yield rate is questionable. 
In the first hypothetical refunding operation (a refunding of 
the ~ctual refunding bonds), the escrow loss, though still sizable, is 
greatly reduced; the average bond interest rate is reduced from 4.17% 
to 3.80%; and the principal amount of the issue remains unchanged. 
In the second hypothetical refunding operation (a refunding of 
the bonds whose average bond interest rate is 3.80%), the escrow loss 
is small; the average bond interest rate is reduced to 3.45%; and the 
principal amount of the bonds remains unchanged. It is emphasized, as 
explained above, that this reduction in average bond interest rate from 
the first to the second hypothetical refunding is arrived at under the 
assumption of identical conditions, including those pertaining to yield 
rates on municipal bonds. Because the bond interest rate reduction is 
substantial, it is clear that a smaller (though sizable) rate reduction 
could take place under conditions of considerably larger yield rates 
on the refunding bonds than on the bonds being refunded. 
In the third hypothetical refunding operation (a refunding of 
the bonds whose average bond interest rate is 3.45%), it was decided 
to reduce the bond interest rate only slightly and determine to what 
extent the principal of the debt could be reduced. With a reduction 
in bond interest rate to 3.40% only, it was found that the principal 
of the debt could be reduced by $49,000 -- from $2,380,000 to 
$2,331,000. 
The above provides an illustration of an important limitation on 
what can be accomplished in one refunding operation. If a bond interest 
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schedule like that of the first hypothetical refunding operation (3.80 
per cent for all maturities) had been set for the actual refunding, 
with no other change in the basic assumptions and conditions, there 
would have been a loss to the Coforado Account (before overhead) of 
$4.28 per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds. This result is 
arrived at by noting, in Table II, that total direct costs in the 
11 Actual Refunding 11 column ($120,383) exceed gross income from under-
writing in Column A under "Hypothetical Refundings" ($110,188) by 
$10,195 and then by dividing the latter figure by 2,380. If concessions 
to selling dealers are assumed to be the same as for the actual refund-
ing ($22,347), an underwriting loss of $32,542 before overhead ($10,195 
plus $22,347), or $13.67 per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds, 
is obtained. The simple reason for this loss is the fact that the 
interest rate (3.80 per cent) on the refunding bonds, under the con-
ditions indicated, is not high enough to yield, on the sale of these 
bonds, the amount of money required to finance the refunding operation. 
If the conditions of the second hypothetical refunding had been 
assumed (3.45% bond interest on all maturities) in the actual refund-
ing, th~ loss to the Colorado Account (before overhead) -- based upon 
total direct costs in the "Actual Refunding" column of Table II and 
gross income from underwriting in Column B under 11 Hypothetical Refund-
ings" -- would have been $59,686 or $25.08 per $1,000 par value of the 
refunding bonds. Assuming the same concessions as above to the selling 
dealers, the underwriting loss (before overhead) would have been $34.47. 
The average underwriting and selling profit (before overhead) 
for the four refunding issues described above is $17.44 per $1,000 par 
value of the refunding bonds; for the actual refunding operation it 
was $19.18. 
Purposes For Which School Bonds Are Advance Refunded 
School bonds are advance refunded for four basic purposes. There 
is the objective, first, of reducing the burden to the taxpayer arising 
from debt servicing. Second, there may be the desire to spread maturities 
over shorter or longer periods, depending upon circumstances, than those 
of the bonds presently outstanding. Third, it may be necessary to 
reduce the existing indebtedness to make possible additional borrowing 
within debt limitations. Fourth, debt consolidation or other corrective 
measures may be desired for a variety of reasons. Two or more of these 
objectives can commonly be gained in one refunding operation; each will 
be examined in following paragraphs.· 
Examples have already been presented showing how bond interest 
payments or principal amount of the debt, or both, can be reduced by 
refunding. 
The credit standing of a school district may be adversely 
affected by the existence of outstanding bonds with maturities extend-
ing far into the future. Under such conditions, the refunding operation 
may be employed to convert the debt to one with maturities extending 
over a shorter period, thereby improving the district's credit stand-
ing to the point conceivably that additional bonds could be sold at 
lower interest rates than would otherwise be possible. 
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Table I 
PRINCIPAL AMOUNTS OF BONDS (ORIGINAL AND REFUNDING), BOND INTEREST RATES 
AND YI ELD RAT ES ON REFUNDING.: RANGELY SCHOOL DISTRICT No. RE-4, 
RIO BLANCO COUNTY, COLORADO 
Building 
Bonds Dated Refunding 
!',"lay 1, 1959 Building Bonds Hypothetical Refunding Bonds Dated Yield 
Principal Dat§d May 1 1 1963 - Aug. 1 1 1963 -- PrinciQal Due l-1/1 Rate 
Due 11/1 Principal Interest A B C On All 
Year (Int. -~ 4Y-,%) Due 11/1 Rate ( Int .@3. 8C'%) ( Int .@3 .45%) ( Int .@3 .40%) Refundinqs 
1963 $ 140,000 $ 140,000 4.5% $ 140,000 $ 140,000 $ 140,000 1.80% 
1964 140,000 150,000 4.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 2.00 
1965 140,000 150,000 4.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 2.20 
1966 140,000 150,000 4.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 2.40 
1967 140,000 150,000 4.5 150,000 150,QOO 150,000 2.50 
1968 140,000 150,000 4.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 2.60 
1969 140,000 150,000 -3.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 2.70 
U' 1970 140,000 150,000 3.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 2.80 
1971 140,000 150,000 3.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 2.90 
1972 140,000 150,000 3.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 3.00 
1973 140,000 150,000 3.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 3.10 
1974 140,000 150,000 3.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 3.20 
1975 140,000 150,000 3.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 3.30 
1976 140,000 150,000 3.5 150,000 150,000 150,000 3.35 
1977 140,000 145,000 4.0 145,000 145,000 145,000 3.40 
1978 140,000 145,000 4.0 145,000 145,000 96,000 3.40 
1979 1401000 -Total $2,380,000 $2,380,000 --- $2,380,000 $2,380,000 $2,331,000 
Table II 
RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS: ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL REFUNDINGS OF RANGELY SCHOOL DISTRICT BONDS 
Effects of Refunding: 
Principal amount 
Interest to maturity 
Total principal and interest 
Savings: 
Reduction in principal 
Reduction in interest paid to maturity 
Total reduction in principal and interest 
Average rate of interest 
Summary of Underwriter's Receipts and 
Expenditures: 
1 Receipts: 
o- Gross sales price of refunding bonds 
Discou~ted value of "B" coupons 
Total 
Cost of refunding bonds (par) 
Gross income from underwriting 
Deduct direct costs 
Escrow bank fee 
Cost of U.S. Treasury obligations in excess 
of par proceeds of refunding issue 
Beginning cash balance required for escrow 
Consideration, escrow agreement 
Approving attorneys' fees 
Bond printing · 
Travel, CPA fees, telephone 
Total direct costs 
Original 
Issue 
Actual 
Refunding 
Hypothetical Refundinfu 
ffi Ifil C 
$2,380,000 $2,380,000 $2,380,000b $2,380,000b $2,331,000b 
910,350a 793,525a 701,100 636,525 601,894 
3.290.350 3,173,525 3,081,100 3,016,525 2,932,894 
-o- -o- -o- 49,000 
$ 116,825 $ 92,425c $ 64,575 $ 34,631 
116,825 92,425C 64,575 83,631 
4.50% 4.17% 3.80% 3.45% 3.40% 
$2,488,096 $2,490,188 $2,440,697 $2,384,556 
57,939 -o- -o- -o-
2,546,035 2,490,188 2,440,697 2,384,556 
2,380,000 2,380,000 2,380,000 2,331,000 
$ 166,035 $ 110,188 $ 60,697 $ 53,556 
4,200 4,200 4,200 4,200 
111,096 65,163 5,467 6,376 
453 806 422 231 
10 10 10 10 
3,207 3,207 3,207 3,166 
393 393 393 385 
1.024 1,024 1,024 1,020 
$ 120,383 $ 74,803 $ 14,723 $ 15,388 
-J 
Total profit to underwriters (before 
overhead) 
Deduct concessions to selling dealers 
Underwriting profit (before overhead) 
Underwriting profit (before overhead) 
per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds 
Total profit (before overhead) per $1,000 
par value of the refunding bonds 
a. Interest prorated to May 1, 1963. 
Table II 
(continued) 
Original 
Issue 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
Actual 
Refunding 
45,652 $ 
221347 
23,305 $. 
9.79 $ 
19.18 $ 
Hypothetical Refundinfil 
To1 1fil · C 
35,385 $ 45,974 $ 38,168 
221347 221347 221347 
13,038 $ 23,627 $ 15,821 
5.48 $ 9.93 $ 6.79 
14.87 $ 19.32 $ 16.37 
b. Interest prorated to August 1, 1963. 
c. Not fully comparable with other savings shown because of the difference between the "prorated" 
dates of May 1 and August 1, 1963. 
If the problem of credit standing is not involved and there is 
the desire to spread the burden to the taxpayer over a period of in-
creased length, thereby reducing the annual tax required to service 
the debt, the refunding issue cart be set up to accomplish this objec-
tive. This, however, is subject to the limitation lunless voter 
approval to the contrary is obtained) that neither the average bond 
interest rate nor total bond interest payments of the refunding issue 
shall exceed those of the bonds to be refunded. If the maturities are 
extended too far into the future, the required bond interest payments 
will be increased. 
With reference to the third of the reasons for refunding 
mentioned above, that of reducing the bonded debt, it is noted that the 
premiums at which the refunding bonds can be sold are an important 
determinant of the extent of the possible reduction in the principal 
amount of the bonds and that the premiums, in turn, are dependent in 
large part upon the bond interest rates. To make the desired reduction 
in the bonded debt, therefore, it is necessary to set the bond interest 
rates as high as feasible, subject to the limitation noted above. 
Under conditions that sometimes exist, debt consolidation may 
be a highly desirable objective. Among the bonds that were refunded 
for Jefferson County School District R-1, for example, sixteen separate 
bond issues and eight separate payment dates during the year were 
represented. It was possible to refund all of these in five refunding 
issues with only two payment dates during the year, namely, March 1 
and September 1. This brought about an obvious potential saving in 
clerical and administrative costs incident to debt servicing: and the 
choice of payment dates to agree closely with property tax payment 
dates means that loss from idle funds being held to service the debt 
was reduced: C?rrection of a~y marke? irregularity from year to year 
that may exist in the tax levies required to service the debt may be 
accomplished in any refunding. 
It is generally desirable for a school district to have its 
bonds rated by such services as Moody's Investor Service and the 
Standard and Poor Corporation. Inasmuch as size of the issue has a 
bearing upon the willingness of these services to rate the bonds, debt 
consolidation may serve to accomplish this end. 
Depending upon circumstances, it may be feasible and desirable 
to issue refunding bonds in denominations different from those of the 
bonds currently outstanding. By issuing them in denominations of 
$5,000 instead of $1,000, for example, it is understood that collection 
charges may be decreas~d. 
Possible Consequences of Extensive Advance Refundings 
Students of public debt management are by no means in complete 
agreement as to the merits of advance refunding. Although it may be 
employed to accomplish much-to-be-desired ends, as pointed out in the 
above discussion of purposes for which school bonds are refunded, 
cognizance should be taken of possible consequences of extensive use 
of it. 
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In an article by John Gerrity in Daily Bond Buyer (February 27, 
1964), it is noted that total advance refundings by states and locali-
ties increased from $54 million in 1961 to $261 million in 1962 and to 
$1.2 billion in 1963; and J. Anthony Naylor, in "Advance Refundings" 
(a publication of B. J. Van Ingen & Co., Inc.), states that the 1963 
figure represented "more than 12% of the total volume of municipal 
financing" for that year. 
A major concern over this trend, on the part of what appears 
to be an increasing number of debt managers, including some at the 
Federal level, stems from the double use of the tax-exempt privilege. 
According to John Gerrity in the article referred to above, the title 
of which is "Treasury Concerned by Refunding Growth; Warns of Peril to 
Tax-Exempt Privilege," the debt managers of the Treasury "argue that 
the effect of this practice, arising out of the spread in yields, is 
to permit states and localities to use their right to issue tax-exempts 
for the acquisition of income they could not obtain if the tax-immunity 
on refunding as well as original issues did not exist. This, Treasury 
officials say, is an abuse, and may lead to restrictive action by 
Congress, limiting the circumstances under which the traditional tax-
immunity may be used, and specifically eliminating refunding issues 
from that immunity." Moreover, it appears that there are many in the 
municipal bond fraternity generally who oppose use of the advance 
refunding device. 
Basic to this concern are the facts (1) that many of the bonds, 
of both original and refunding issues, are commonly expected to remain 
unredeemed for a period of some years, and (2) that the drain on 
available investment funds resulting from this double financing of 
identical projects could conceivably be large enough to increase in-
terest rates on bond flotations. It should be noted in this connection 
that-the Treasury doesn't question refunding if the refunding issue 
does not precede the maturity or call date of the outstanding issue by 
an unrealistically long period. And, here, Mr. Gerrity suggests the 
desirability of self-policing as a means of exercising control. 
Other matters of concern to students of public debt management 
may be stated as follows: (1) the tax-exempt privilege is already 
under intensified Congressional scrutiny as a "tax loophole'' largely 
because of increasing use of industrial aid financing by state and 
local governments, (2) refunding is regarded as a risky device when the 
bonds are sold substantially in advance of the time when use of the 
proceeds is planned, the thought being that the range of safe predic-
tion rarely exceeds six months, and (3) some contend that tax-immunity 
is outmoded and challengeable on constitutional grounds. 
Appraising the Fairness of the Refunding Agreement 
A fair appraisal of a refunding agreement requires considera-
tion of (1) interest rates on the bonds to be refunded, (2) the 
financial stability or economic base of the district backing the bonds, 
including size of the bond issue, and (3) the condition of the bond 
market as of the date of the agreement, including the rates at which 
government bonds could be bought, and comparative bond maturities. 
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To determine the comparative fairness of two different refund-
ing agreements from the point of view of bond interest rates alone, 
much more than a simple comparison of the interest-maturity schedules 
on the two sets of refunding bonds is required. If the interest rates 
on the bonds to be refunded are higher than those at which government 
bonds can be bought, the cost of governments required for escrow 
purposes will, as already noted, exceed the principal amount of the 
bonds to be refunded. Because a refunding issue of larger total amount 
than that of the issue to be refunded is not permissible, this means 
(unless the School Board provides funds for the purpose) that the re-
funding bonds will have to carry interest rates high enough to 
sell at premiums sufficiently large to account for this excess and 
defray expenses of the refunding operation. Depending upon the in~ 
terest rates of the bonds to be refunded, therefore -- to say nothing 
of other considerations -- there may be wide differences among the 
bond interest rates of refunding issues under conditions of identical 
return to the bond houses. To obtain fair comparative measures of the 
returns to the bond houses, mathematical analyses of the refunding 
operations, as already shown, are needed. 
The fact that a sizable real property base with little or no 
outstanding indebtedness has its impact upon the rating of the refund-
ing bonds and hence upon the yield rates at which the bonds can be 
sold does not need to be be-labored. To explain why this impact upon 
yield rates must be reflected in the level of bond interest rates, it 
is noted (in case of escrow loss on refunding, for example) that 
sufficient premium must be realized to cover this loss and defray• 
expenses. Because variations in yield rates affect the premiums at 
which bonds can be sold, this means that differences in bond backing 
or bond quality should be reflected in bond interest rate differences. 
Moreover, since overhead costs per bond are generally higher for 
small than for large bond issues, size of bond issue becomes an item 
of significance. 
There is an obvious close relationship between condition of 
the bond market (as of the date of the refunding agreement) and the 
yield rates to be realized on refunding bonds; this is likewise true 
of rates at which government bonds can be bought; and these facets of 
the problem, in turn, are closely related to what the interest rates 
on the refunding bonds should be. So far as bond maturities are 
concerned, it should be noted that yield rates on bonds with early 
maturities are generally lower than they are for later maturities and 
hence that average yield rates are dependent to a degree upon compara-
tive maturities. 
In light of the above statements it seems clear that there is 
no easy, off-the-cuff basis for saying that one refunding agreement is 
more fair or less fair to the school district than another. A reason-
ably thoroughgoing analysis of each is required. 
Summary 
A few of the conclusions drawn from this phase of the study 
are pinpointed as follows: 
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1. If interest rates on bonds to be refunded are comparatively 
high, so also will the interest rates be on the refunding bonds unless 
funds to cover the escrow loss are available independent of the refund-
ing operation. This is true because the cost of the governments re-
quired for escrow purposes will exceed, by a considerable margin, the 
principal amount of the bonds to be refunded and the interest rates on 
the refunding bonds will have to be high enough to yield, on sale of 
them, a total premium sufficiently large to cover this escrow loss and 
other expenses of refunding. It follows, therefore, that the compara-
tive fairness of two refunding agreements cannot be appraised by a 
simple comparison of the interest rates on the two issues of refunding 
bonds. 
2. If successive refundings were permissible, the opportunity 
thus provided to trade repeatedly on the tax-free status of school 
bonds would make possible savings, on each refunding, to the taxpayers 
in the school district concerned. The Rangely refundings, for example, 
could be continued with small reductions in bond interest rates and 
substantial reductions in the principal amount of the bonds. 
3. There are hazards in successive advance refundings which 
could conceivably outweigh the advantages that might be derived. The 
added volume of bonds outstanding in the hands of investors could 
cause substantial advances in the yield rates of municipal bonds, thus 
increasing the cost of borrowing money; and this abuse of the tax-
immunity privilege, as many regard successive advance refunding to be, 
could lead to adoption of restrictive measures by Congress. 
4. These hazards with respect to successive advance refund-
ings are believed by some students of public debt management, includ-
ing a few at the Federal level, to exist to a degree when only one 
advance refunding of original issue bonds is permitted. The concern 
in this instance stems from the fact that states and localities can 
issue tax-exempts in the double financing of identical projects to 
acquire income which they could not obtain if the tax-immunity on the 
original and refunding issues did not exist. It is noted, however, 
that one advance refunding can serve a highly desirable purpose many 
times entirely aside from the saving in interest and/or debt reduction. 
It may be used to spread maturities over longer or shorter periods and 
to bring about corrections of various kinds, including consolidation 
of existing debt and reduction of clerical and administrative costs 
incident to debt servicing. 
Steps Involved in the Advance Refunding of School Bonds 
in Colorado by Negotiation 
The procedure followed in the advance refunding of school bonds 
in Colorado by negotiation involves steps as set forth below. To assist 
the reader in visualizing what takes place, details of the negotiation 
in the actual refunding of school bonds for Rangely School District 
No. RE-4 in Rio Blanco County are presented. The principal amount of 
the bonds refunded was $2,380,000. The refunding took place in 
accordance with an agreement between Boettcher and Company and the 
Board of Directors of the District dated June 24, 1963, and detailed 
in a resolution adopted by the Board on July 20, 1963. 
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Step 1. Contact is made between the bond house and the school 
board. ~ither party may take the initiative in making the contact. In 
the large majority of cases to d~te, however, the contacts have been 
made by bond houses. 
On the initiative of Boettcher and Company, a company representa-
tive met with th~ Board of Directors of Rio Blanco School District No. 
RE-4 on December 10, 1962, and presented a proposal which, assuming 
passage of proposed legislation to be introduced to the Colorado General 
Assembly during January, 1963, called for a statement of intent that 
Boettcher and Company would be given the opportunity to try to effect 
the refunding of the bonds. This proposal, agreed to on said date, 
involved no obligation on the School District's part to contract this 
refunding with Boettcher and Company; it was merely an understanding 
that the Company would be given the opportunity to present a plan, or 
plans, of refunding for the District's consideration. From the point 
of view of Boettcher and Company, the proposal was entered into for 
the purpose (1) of gaining support for the proposed legislation and 
(2) of securing an opportunity to attempt the financing in the event 
the enabling legislation was passed. 
Step 2. The bond house explains generally what can probably be 
accomplished by advance refunding, setting forth different alternatives 
but making no firm commitment as to details at this point because the 
necessary analytical work has not been done. As explained at some 
length elsewhere, possibilities as to what can be accomplished through 
advance refunding include (1) reduction of burden to the taxpayer· aris-
ing from debt servicing, (2) spreading of maturities over shorter or 
longer periods and equalizing required tax levies from year to year, (3) 
reduction of existing indebtedness to make possible additional borrowing 
within debt limitations, and (4) debt consolidation to reduce clerical 
and administrative expenses incident to debt servicing, or other 
corrective measures. In the light of extensive discussion of these 
and related matters with the bond house representative the school 
board makes a decision as to what it would like to accomplish through 
refunding; and this decision provides a basis for detailed analysis 
by the bond house. (Step 2 may require a series of sessions of the 
bond house representative with the school board.) 
On May 14, 1963, Mr. Yaeger, Superintendent of Schools, con-
tacted Boettcher and Company concerning Boettcher's interest in their 
refinancing program •. In preparation for a meeting of the School Board 
on June 10, 1963, Boettcher and Company made an analysis (believed to 
be more extensive than is common at this stage of the negotiation) of 
the refunding possibilities available to the School District. On the 
basis of this analysis a company representative, in addition to 
discussing the concept and the potentials of refunding at said meeting, 
presented several alternative plans of refunding for the Board's con-
sideration. The Board took no formal action at the meeting; it asked 
for mo~e time to consider the proposals; and it requested that certain 
revisions be made in the plans submitted. 
Step 3. The bond house does the necessary analytical work and 
firms up a proposal which, in its judgment, would meet the expressed 
desires of the board. Involved in this analytical work are (1) a 
determination of the amount of the U.S. Treasury obligations, by · 
maturities, that must be bought to make bond interest and redemption 
payments (as they come due) on the bonds to be refunded, (2) a check 
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on the bond market for governments to determine the prices at which 
the required governments could be bought and the total cost thereof, 
(3) an examination of the bond market for municipals to determine the 
probable yield rates (for different maturities} at which refunding 
bonds issued by the district could be sold, and (4} a determination of 
the interest rates on the refunding bonds which are necessary, on the 
sale of these bonds, to yield the amount of money required to support 
the refunding operation, 
Since school boards are generally not staffed to do what is 
called for in both this step and the preceding, it is noted that a plan 
whereby public sale of refunding bonds (with competitive bids} would 
be required would necessitate an arrangement to have this service 
rendered by some one else. Whether this service were rendered by a 
private company for a fee or by a state-supported agency, it should be 
recognized that a highly trained staff would be a prime essential to 
successful operation. Included in the needs are one or more analysts 
capable of doing the technical \\Ork described above, one or more 
specialists in market trends as they relate to prices of both municipals 
and governments, and a means of keeping in close touch with market de-
velopments. 
It is noted further that the rendering of this service appears 
to involve both a science and an art. As a science, it is concerned 
with the technical analytical work and the knowledge of market trends 
referred to above; the requirements in these respects can probably be 
met reasonably satisfactorily in the environment of a state agency. 
On the other hand, tying in with the need for a means of keeping in 
close touch with market developments, it appears that an art may be 
involved in making the necessary decisions pertaining to market trans-
actions in the light of these developments. If so -- if gaining and 
maintaining the needed skill requires extensive day-to-day experience 
in ~he handling of these transactions -- a question may be raised as 
to whether it would be wise to place the responsibility of making such 
decisions in the hands of a state agency. 
Between June 10 and June 24, Boettcher and Company revised its 
analytical work to comply with the Board's request at the June 10 meet-
ing and extended it to the point of being able to make firm commitment 
on either of two plans called Plan A and Plan B. After considering 
the proposals, the School Board (at its June 24, 1963, meeting} accepted 
refunding Plan A and entered into an underwriting agreement with 
Boettcher and Company & Associates. Refunding Plan A stipulated a 
reduction in the average interest rate from 4.5% to 4.17~% and a 
reduction in interest payment to maturity (prorated to May 1, 1963} of 
at least $115,221.25. This plan actually decreased the School 
District's average annual debt service requirements as compared to 
existing debt service requirements. Under refunding Plan B, which was 
not accepted by the District, the reduction in interest paid to 
maturity would have been at least $193,920.00. This plan required a 
slight increase in average annual debt service requirements over a 
slightly shorter maturity schedule. The District apparently preferred 
refunding Plan A in order that a slight decrease in the mill levy 
requirements necessary to service their bonded indebtedness might be 
effected. 
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It is noted that, at the meeting on June 24, 1963, the Board 
received a competitive proposal from an underwriting group comprised 
of three investment bankers from.Kansas City. 
Step 4. The proposal prepared by the bond h?use in Step 3 or 
some modification of it, as agreed upon by the parties, forms the 
basis for the refunding agreement. If said proposal is modified 
significantly, a re-computation in part may be necessary. Before the 
aoreement is finalized, the bond house representative makes clear to 
the school board what the refunding would accomplish for the school 
district, including a guaranteed stated reduction in the average 
bond interest r~te (from th8 bonds to be refunded to the refunding 
bonds) and a guaranteed amount to be saved. 
In line with general business practice, the bond house commonly 
does not disclose what it expects to make on the refunding transaction; 
and such disclosure was not made to the Board in the course of the 
Rangely negotiations. However, for purposes of illustration in this 
report, the Rangely figure is revealed; as discussed at greater length 
elsewhere, it is $9.79 per $1,000 par value of refunding bonds (before 
overhead), from which such items as staff time required to confer with 
the board and do the necessary analytical work, rental of quarters and 
equipment, secretarial services, office supplies and expense, and 
general company overt1ead must be subtracted. There is no cost account-
ing for these overhead items. 
Immediately following the June 24 meeting of the Rangely Bbard 
the analytical work was finalized to yield the details of the refunding 
agreement which were incorporated in the July 20, 1963 resolution of the 
Board referred to above. On July l, 1963, Boettcher and Company wrote 
the District and advised them that the interest coupons ultimately 
set on the refunding bond issue resulted in a slightly larger saving 
to the School District than indicated in the underwriting agreement 
dated June 24, 1963. The total reduction in interest (prorated to 
May l, 1963) amounted to $116,825.00, or $1,603.75 more than the 
savings originally indicated in the underwriting agreement. The net 
effective interest rate on the refunding issue, based upon the interest 
cost reduction of $116,825.00, was 4.166%. 
In addition to the interest saving outlined above, the District 
will realize an additional saving resulting from a law enacted by·the 
1964 session of the Colorado Legislature which eliminated, effective 
July l, 1964, the 1% fee charged by some County Treasurers on the 
proceeds received from refunding bond escrows. Since the 1% treasurer's 
fee was provided for in the case of the escrow refunding the District's 
debt, these funds, totalling $27,271.72, will revert back to the 
District. Also reverting back to the School District will be the 
return realized from the reinvestment of idle cash in the escrow. 
While sµch a return, if any, cannot be anticipated at the present time, 
the minimum savings to be realized by the District will be $116,825.00 
plus $27,271.72, or a total of $144,096.72. 
Step 5. The computations made to determine the amount of the 
escrow that is needed to meet the bond interest and redemption payments 
(as they come due) on the bonds to be refunded are verified by a certi-
fied public accountant; and the proposed refunding agreement is 
checked by attorneys to see that it is legal in all respects. Commonly, 
both the accountant and the attorney are employed by the bond house. 
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It is noted in this connection that most of the legal work in Denver 
has been done by Tallmadge and Tallmadge or Dawson, Nagel, Sherman, 
and Howard. 
Subsequent to the execution of the underwriting agreement on 
June 24, 1963, Boettcher and Company retained a firm of nationally 
recognized municipal approving attorneys to prepare all proceedings, 
resolutions and agreements requisite to the issuance of the refunding 
bonds. A firm of Certified Public Accountants was also retained to 
verify the proposed transactions in the refunding escrow in accordance 
with the requirements of the enabling law permitting refundings of 
this nature. 
Tallmadge and Tallmadge had the responsibility for the legal 
proceedings throughout the refunding operations; and Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Company verified the escrow requirements. This verification 
was certified to by letter dated July 17, 1963. 
Step 6. The refunding bonds are printed; offering circulars 
are prepared indicating the yield rates at which these bonds may be 
bought; and, at the time the bonds are sold, U.S. Treasury obligations 
are bought and placed in escrow according to the predetermined require-
ments. Inasmuch as this step is taken subsequent to the time at which 
the refunding agreement is finalized, some change in the bond market 
is likely to have taken place in the meantime. The price at which the 
governments can be bought and the price at which the refunding bonds 
can be sold tend to move up together or down together. If they move 
up, for example, the paper loss on the governments tends to be offset 
by a paper increase in the premium at which the refunding bonds can be 
sold. The result is that a paper loss (or gain) on one transaction 
tends to be offset by a paper gain (or loss) on the other. While this 
offsEtting tendency exists, an element of risk to the bond house is 
involved which may turn in a given instance to the advantage or the 
disadvantage of the bond house. This, of course, stems from the fact 
that the bond house has previously entered into a binding contract 
with the school board. 
It should be noted (1) that the underwriter purchases, for his 
own account, the U.S. Treasury obli9ations required to effect and, 
establish the refunding escrow and \2) that these governments must be 
available on the date of closing and delivery of the refunding bonds 
to the ultimate purchasers before a legal opinion attesting to the 
validity of the refunding bond issue can be rendered by the municipal 
approving attorneys. If, for any reason, the transaction is not 
consummated, the risk involved in the ownership of the governments is 
the underwriter's only; subsequent resale of them, assuming that the 
underwriting is not consummated, will ordinarily result in a gain or 
loss, such gain or loss to accrue to the underwriter. In the purchase 
of the government obligations, the underwriter arranges all financing 
and there is no obligation on the part of the School District in this 
respect. 
In the Rangely refunding, the underwriters purchased the required 
governments between June 24, 1963, and July 10, 1963. The refunding 
bonds were offered on or about July 1, 1963, in accordance with an 
offering circular issued shortly pribr thereto. The escrow agreement 
was finalized on Au9ust 16, 1963. 
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The details of the financial transactions involved are set 
forth as follows: 
(a) To meet the escrow requirements, Boettcher and Company 
bought $2,310,000 par value of government bonds and $~58,000 of Treasury 
Bills at a total cost of $2 491,096.01. This amount includes a 
financing fee of $2,887.50 il/8 of 1% on the par value of the government 
bonds) which was paid by Boettcher and Company to Boettcher Investments, 
Inc. The latter, it is understood, was not a part of the Colorado 
Account. 
(b) The Rangely School District sold $2,380,000 par value of 
refunding bonds for a cash outlay to Boettcher and Company of $2,380,000, 
said refunding bonds having interest rates which averaged 4.17%. See 
the last paragraph under (c) below. 
(c) The Rangely School District paid $2,380,000 to Boettcher and 
Company in part payment of the governments for the escrow. The selling 
of the refunding bonds at premiums in (b) above provided additional 
funds to finance the refunding operation. 
According to the terms (Item #3) of the June 24, 1963 contract, 
the District was required to deposit in the escrow account the $2,380,000 
par proceeds, plus $31,237.50, representing the interest accruing from 
the next preceding interest payment date of May 1, 1963 to the date of 
closing, August 16, 1963, during which period the District had an actual 
liability toward its refunded debt. The District received,. in addition 
to the $2,380,000 par payment tor its refunding bonds, $27,314.59 in 
accrued interest on the new issue. The difference between these two 
interest items is $3,922.91, and the difference occurs in the fact 
that the rate of accrual of interest on the refunding issue is slightly 
lower than it is on the refunded issue because of the different 
arrangements of interest coupons on the two issues. The difference, 
however, is part of the total interest difference (or interest 
reduction) of $116,825 when the interest on both issues is figured to 
maturity. 
(d) The Colorado Account, of which Boettcher and Company was 
the manager, sold the refunding bonds to various members of the Account 
for a total of $2,465,749.60; and the same were sold by the various 
members of the Account to the ultimate purchasers for $2,488,096.60. 
The difference between these two figures, $22,347.00, is the amount of 
the concessions paid by the Colorado Account to its various members as 
a selling commission in marketing the bonds. 
(e) Attached to the refunding bonds, as printed, were (1) 11 A11 
coupons with rates of interest ranging from 3½ per cent to 4~ per cent 
and (2) 11 B11 coupons of ½ of 1 per cent per annum "for the period 
Novemb~r 1, 1963, to November 1, 1973, inclusive, or to th~ respective 
maturity dates of the bonds to which said 'B' coupons are attached, 
whichever is the earliest date. 11 Prior to the sale of the refunding 
bonds, the 11 8 11 coupons were detached, the discounted value of which 
thereby became additional income to Boettcher and Company. The total 
amount of these 11 B11 coupons (before discounting) was $78,250. The 
discounted value of these coupons, at 7% per annum (3~ per six months), 
calculated from September 1, 1963, amounted to $57,938.75. This 
discounted value is the income which accrued to the Colorado Account 
from this source. 
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(f) The above are the first five items shown in the table of 
receipts and disbursements (Table III) associated with the Rangely 
refunding operation, with the three offsetting items discussed in the 
second paragraph of (c) above di.sregarded. Presented in it also are 
other items of expense which are believed to be self-explanatory. The 
difference between the receipts and the disbursements, $23,305.57, is 
the underwriting profit (before overhead) to the Colorado Account. 
Step 7, Upon completion of the refunding transaction, the bank 
with which·the escrow is placed accepts the responsibility, according 
to terms of the escrow agreement, of administering the escrow and mak-
ing bond interest and redemption payments on the refunded bonds as they 
come due1 and the school board has the responsibility of making such 
payments on the refunding bonds. The refunded-bonds have been eliminated 
from the legal debt of the school district; replacing them are the 
refunding bonds. 
In the Rangely refunding, the escrow is administered by the 
Denver U.S. National Bank. · 
As stated above, the underwriting profit realized from the 
Rangely refunding (before overhead) per $1,000 par value of refunding 
bonds was $9.79. On the entire issue of $2,380,000, this amounted to 
an underwriting profit (before overhead) of $23,305.57. To this figure 
is added $22,347.00, the combined concessions to various dealers, out 
of which staff salaries (both professional and clerical), telephone 
costs, shipping and insurance fees·, and other costs of doing business 
were defrayed~ The underwriting and selling profit (before overhead) 
totaled $45,.6¢2.57 or $19.18 per $1,000 par value of the refunding 
bonds. The financing fee of $2,887.50, which represented income to 
Boettcher Investments, Inc., but not to the Colorado Account, is 
supplemental to this figure. When this is added to the above, a total 
income {before overhead} of $48,540.07 to the bond houses, or $20.39 
per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds, is obtained. The saving 
of the Rangely School District spread over the life of the bonds (with 
interest prorated to May 1, 1963} will total at least $116,825, or 
$49i09 per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds, to which is added 
the 1% treasurer's fee allowance of $27,271.72. 
Table III 
RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS: COLORADO ACCOUNT 
REFUNDING OF RANGELY SCHOOL DISTRICT BONDS 
Receipts \ 
From Rangely School District toward 
escrow requirements 
Sale of refunding bonds to Account 
Members 
Discounted value of 11 8 11 coupons 
Disbursements 
Purchase of governments for escrow 
purposes 
Refunding bonds from Rangely 
School District 
Escrow bank fee 
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$2,380,000.00 
2,465,749.60 
57.938.75 $4,903,688.35 
$2,491,096.01 
2,380,000.00 
4,200.00 
Table III 
(continued) 
· Beginning cash balance required 
for escrow 
Consideration, escrow agreement 
Approving attorney 1 s fees 
Bond printing 
Travel, CPA fees, telephone 
Underwriting profit (before overhead) 
Concessions to selling dealers (before 
overhead) 
Total profit to underwriters (before overhead) 
Underwriting profit (before overhead) 
per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds 
Total profit (before overhead) per $1,000 
par value of the refunding bonds 
453.40 
1a.aa 
3,206.44 
393.05 
1,023.88 4,880,382.78 
$ 23,305.57 
22,347.00 
$ 45,652.57 
$ 9.79 
$ 19.18 
Advance Refunding of Colorado School Bonds Before and 
After Dissolution of the Colorado Account 
In foregoing references to the actual refunding of school bonds 
for Rangely School District No. RE-4 in Rio Blanco County, facts were 
presented on saving to the school district, gross income from under-
writing, expenses of refunding (including escrow loss), concessions to 
selling dealers, underwriting profit (before overhead), and total pro-
fit to underwriters (before overhead). The purpose of this section of 
the report is to present similar data for what, it is understood, com-
prises all refundings of Colorado school bonds by the Colorado Account 
during the period of its existence and all such refundings -- from 
dissolution of the Account to August 1, 1964 -- in which Boettcher and 
Company was involved as the sole bond house concerned or as one of two 
or more participants. This is done for each of a number of groups 
according to credit rating of the school district, namely, AA, A, BAA, 
and non-rated. 
Included in this study is a total of $98,022,000 par amount of 
refunding school bonds. The refundings through the Colorado Account 
totalled $81,680,000; and those handled by Boettcher and Company and 
associates in the Post Colorado Account period totalled $16,342,000. 
Other refunding school bonds in Colorado which have been issued since 
the enabling legislation was passed in 1963, the total of which is not 
known precisely, are known to have approximated $22,000,000. This means 
that t~e par amount of refunding school bonds issued in Colorado during 
the period of twenty months from March 1, 1963, to November 1, 1964, 
totals approximately $120,000,000. 
The tabular categories listed above should be described. The 
saying to the school district consists of reduction in bond interest 
over the life of the bond issue and/or in par value or redemption price 
(if different from par value) of the bonds; as reported, it excludes 
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the 1% County Treasurer's fee which was included in the escrow in 
refundings which took place prior to passage of the law removing it; 
it was computed from original proposals made to the districts or in 
some instances it was taken direttly from the authorizing resolutions; 
and some of the computations and tabulations were made from sources 
more readily available to save time. 
Gross income from underwriting comprises gross sales price of 
refunding bonds to ultimate purchasers (as projected at the time of 
"sale'' to the selling dealers), discounted value of "B" coupons (if 
any), and escrow gain (if any)~ cost of refunding bonds (at par). 
Here, it was not unusual, during the period in which the Colorado 
Account was in existence, for the actual sales price to the ultimate 
purchasers to be less than the projected sales-pric~, thus having the 
effect of reducing the selling dealers' income. It is understooa 
that the actual sales price was never greater than the projected sales 
price. Gross income was computed from offering circulars; in three or 
four instances, it included undiscounted values of short "B" coupons 
or supplemental coupons; and all dollar production achieved from the 
sales was computed from the dates of the refunding issues and not from 
the actual dates of delivery to the underwriters or to the ultimate 
purchasers. 
Takedowns and concessions to the selling dealers are the 
difference between the projected sales price and the price at which 
the bonds were sold to the selling dealers. It is noted (1) that, in 
view of the above, the reported takedowns and concessions as a whole 
are an overstatement of the true income in this category to all bond 
houses combined, (2) that a sizable part of the takedowns and con-
cessions to selling dealers during the Colorado Account period --
roughly estimated to be one-half of the total -- went to dealers out-
side of Colorado, (3) that the realized takedowns and concessions are 
befoie overhead and that t~ overhead of selling dealers comprises 
staff salaries -- both professional and clerical -- telephone costs, 
shipping and insurance fees, and other costs of doing business, and 
(4) that the figures presented are close approxim~tions, subject to 
the above qualifications, obtained by deducting expenses of refunding 
and profit from underwriting (before overhead) from gross income from 
underwriting. 
Expenses of refunding include escrow loss (if any), beginning 
cash balance required for escrow, escrow bank fee, consideration for 
the escrow agreement, approving attorneys' fees, bond printing, travel, 
CPA fees, and telephone costs. Expenses of refunding including escrow 
loss were taken from the account settlement statements. 
Underwriting profit (before overhead) is gross income from 
underwriting less takedowns and concessions to selling dealers and 
total expenses of refunding; it was taken from the account settlement 
statements. Overhead, in this instance, comprises salary items for 
staff time required to confer with school boards and do the necessary 
analytical work, rental of quarters and equipment, secretarial 
services, office supplies and expense, and general company overhead. 
The savings to Colorado school districts from a total of 
twenty-three advance refundings during the Colorado Account period, in 
principal and interest but exclusive of the 1% County Treasurer's fee, 
amounted to $4,100,740; and the income (before overhead) to the Colorado 
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Account resulting therefrom, takedowns and concessions to selling 
dealers and underwriting profit combined, totalled $1,299,21~2 (Table 
IV). This means that the savings to school districts spread over the 
life of the bonds were $3.16 for each dollar of income to the Colorado 
Account before overhead. The corresponding figures for the period 
subsequent to dissolution of the Account, based upon eight refundings, 
are: savings to school districts, $1,259,811; income to the bond 
houses before overhead, $365,892; and savings to school districts per 
dollar of income to the bond houses, $3.44. 
If the 1% Treasurer's fee is included with principal and 
interest savings, the total savings to the school district during the 
Colorado Account period, per dollar of income to the Colorado Account, 
were $3.92 (instead of $3.16); and, for the period subsequent to 
dissolution of the Account, they were $3.44 (unchanged by change of 
the law). 
It is noted that the underwriters were instrumental in calling 
to the attention of the various school officials involved in refunding 
the additional savings that could be effected by the elimination of 
the County Treasurer's one per cent collection fee. As a result, the 
Codification of School Laws Committee recommended the repeal of the 
law, which recommendation was adopted by the General Assembly in the 
1964 session. 
In the Rangely refunding the saving to the School District 
per dollar of income to the Colorado Account was $2.56. This is based 
upon a saving of $116,825 as reported elsewhere. If the alternative 
proposal to the Rangely School District calling for a saving of 
$193,920 had been accepted, the saving per dollar of income to the 
Account -- assuming the same income as in the actual refunding -- would 
have been $4.25. This illustration is presented as a caution against 
drawing hasty conclusions based upon cursory comparisons of the results 
of one refunding operation with those of another. The greater saving 
in the Rangely refunding would have required an increase in the tax 
levy over a comparatively short period; the plan preferred by the Board 
called for spreading the maturities over a longer period so as to bring 
about a small reduction in the tax levy. 
The results of refunding in the Colorado Account period are 
compared with those which took place subsequent to dissolution of the 
Account; this is done in terms of dollars per $1,000 par value of 
refunding bonds for each credit rating class to which the school 
districts belong and for all such classes combined (Table V). 
Total income to the bond houses (before overhead) per $1,000 par 
value of the refunding bonds, takedowns and concessions to selling 
dealers and profit from underwriting combined, were smaller for total 
refundings of the Colorado Account l$15.91) than they have been since 
the dissolution of the Account ($22.39). Comparative figures for take-
downs and concessions to selling dealers are $5.60 in the Colorado 
Account period and $8.33 in the Post Colorado Account period; and for 
2. As noted elsewhere, a sizable part of this item roughly estimat-
ed to total $225,000 -- went to dealers outside of Colorado. 
- 20 -
r-J ,_. 
Par 
Credit Amount 
Ratina Refunding 
,:..;., $47,713,000 
A 15,924,000 
BAA 9,550,000 
Non-rated 8,423,000 
TOT,-..L $81,680,000 
" $ 9,373,000 
s- 6,420,000 
Non-rated ~4~,000 
TOT ,..L $16,342,000 
Table IV 
ADVANCE REFUNDING OF SCHOOL BONDS IN COLORADO BY CREDIT RATING OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
(All Data Expressed in Total Dollar MTIOunts) 
Principal Expenses 
& Interest l Per Cent Total Gross T akedowns & Including 
Savina Treasurer's Fee Saving Income Concessionsa Escrow 
A. Advance Refunding by the Colorado Accountb 
$2,611,648.80 $596,909.32 $3,208,558.12 $ 771,695.62 $143,908.60 $159,171.49 
610,924.90 185,853.90 796,778.80 448,467.78 121,987.32 128,702.78 
528,731.64 120,030.71 648,762.35 227,111.50 88,936.17 64,537.93 
349,434.40 85,746.89 435,181.29 385,609,47 102,267.04 181,257.25 
$4,100,739.74 $988,540.82 $5,089,280.56 $1,832,884.37 $457,799.13 $533,669.45 
B, Advance Refunding Subsequent to Dissolution of the Colorado Accountc 
$ 909,865.77 $ 0.00 $ 909,865.77 $ 261,861.30 $ 51,925.92 $ 82,547.82 
314,740.72 0.00 314,740.72 192,194.95 80,491.36 15,476.12 
35,205,00 0.00 35,205,00 15,609.70 3,645.00 2,750.00 
$1,259,811.49 0.00 $1,259,811.49 $ 469,665.95 $136,062.28 $103,773.94 
Underwriting Total 
Profit Takedowns & 
Before Concessions and 
Overhead Underwriting PrQfi1 
$468,615.53 $ 612,524.13 
197,777.68 319,765.00 
73,637.40 162,573.57 
101,385.18 204.352.22 
$841,415.79 $1,299,214.92 
$127,387.56 $ 179,313.48 
96,227.47 176,718.83 
6,214.70 9,fl59,70 
$229,829.73 $ 365,892.01 
a. "sizable part of the takedowns and concessions to selling dealers during the Colorado ,-..ccount period roughly estimated to be one-half of the 
total -- went to dealers outside of Colorado. 
b. All advance refundings of school bonds by the Colorado Account. 
c. All advance refundings of school bonds in Colorado from dissolution of the Colorado Account to August 1, 1964, in which Boettcher and Company 
was involved as the sole bond house concerned or as one of two or more participants. 
Table V 
ADVANCE REFUNDING OF SCHOOL BONDS IN COLORADO BY CREDIT 
RATING OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
(Dollars per $1,000 Par Value of the Refunding Bonds) 
Credit Rating and Classification 
Saving to the School Districts 
Principal and Interest 
AA 
A 
BAA 
Non-Rated 
Average 
One Per Cent Treasurer's Fee 
AA 
A 
BAA 
Non-Rated 
Average 
Total Saving 
AA 
A 
BAA 
Non-Rated 
Average 
Gross Income from Underwriting 
AA 
A 
BAA 
Non-Rated 
Average 
Takedowns & Concessions to Selling Dealersb 
AA 
A 
BAA 
Non-Rated 
Average 
Expenses of Refunding, Including Escrow Loss 
AA 
A 
BAA 
Non-Rated 
Average 
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Post 
Colorado Colorado 
Account Account 
$54.74 
38.37 
55.36 
41.14 
50.20 
12.51 
11.67 
12.57 
10.10 
12.10 
67.24 
50.04 
67.93 
51.24 
62.31 
16.17 
28.16 
23.78 
45.40a 
22.44 
3.02 
7.66 
9.31 
12.12 
5.60 
3.34 
8.08 
6.76 
21.34a 
6.53 
$ ---
97.07 
49.03 
64.13 
77.09 
o.oo 
o.oo 
o.oo 
o.oo 
97.07 
49.03 
64 .13 
77.09 
27.94 
29.94 
28.43 
28.74 
5.54 
12.54 
6.64 
8.33 
8.81 
2.41 
10.47 
6.35 
Table V 
(continued) 
Credit Rating and Classification 
Colorado 
Account 
Post 
Colorado 
Account 
Profit from Underwriting (Before Overhead) 
AA $ 9.82 
12.42 
7.71 
11.94 
10.30 
$ ---
13.59 
14.99 
11.32 
14.06 
A 
BAA 
Non-Rated 
Average 
Total Takedowns & Concessions and Profit 
From Underwriting (Before Overhead) 
AA 12.84 
20.08 
17.02 
24.06 
15.91 
a. 
b. 
A 
BAA 
Non-Rated 
Average 
19.13 
27.53 
17.96 
22.39 
The expense (including escrow loss) for the non-rated bonds is 
above average because of a large escrow loss resulting from a high 
bond interest rate on a large block of refunded bonds and this, 
in turn, necessitated an offsetting above-average gross income. 
A sizable part of the takedowns and concessions to selling dealers 
during the Colorado Account period -- roughly estimated to be one-
half of the total -- went to dealers outside of Colorado. 
profit from underwriting they are $10.30 and $14.06, respectively. 3 
By credit rating classes there are several exceptions to this relation-
ship between the two periods. 
It should be noted that the above figures are not fully com-
parable -- one period with the other -- because of differences in 
weighting. Since both takedowns and concessions and profit from under-
writing are lower for Class AA bonds per $1,000 par value than they 
are for the average of all classes, the absence of AA bonds in the Post 
Colorado Account period (in contrast to a sizable volume of such bonds 
in the Colorado Account period) gives the averages for the Post Colorado 
Account period an upward bias. It is found, however, that weighting 
the figures (for the three classes A, BAA, and non-rated for which 
there are data in both periods) according to the distribution of bonds 
among these classes in (1) the Colorado Account period and (2) the 
Post Colorado Account period yields averages for the latter period --
for takedowns and concessions and profit from underwriting combined --
3. These figures do not include the financing fee, an expense to the 
Colorado Account, which was paid to Boettcher Investments, Inc. 
This fee of 1/8 per cent on the principal amounts of the government 
bonds placed in escrow represents additional income, in a sense, to 
the bond houses. 
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which are larger than those for the Colorado Account period. For 
takedowns and concessions alone, this procedure yields somewhat smaller 
averages for the Post Colorado Account period than for the Colorado 
Account period; in the case of profit from underwriting, the averages 
so obtained for the Post Colorado Account period are considerably the 
larger. 
Takedowns and concessions to selling dealers are perhaps the 
only category shown in the table in which there is a significant 
relationship between magnitude of the figures and rating class. One 
would expect the cost of selling AA bonds to be less per $1,000 of par 
value of the refunding bonds than it would be for A bonds, and similarily 
for A bonds as compared with BAA bonds and for BAA bonds as compared with 
non-rated bonds. This relationship did exist in the Colorado Account 
period and, with one exception, in the Post Colorado Account period. In 
the case of savings to the school districts, the fact that other ob-
jectives than that of maximizing savings are significant tends to blur 
the picture. Likewise, as already noted, conditions peculiar to a given 
situation such as high interest rates on the bonds to be refunded may 
cause the expenses of refunding and hence the gross income from under-
writing to be abnormally high. 
Because the Rangely refunding has been used for purposes of 
illustration and the Rangely School District is non-rated, a comparison 
of the results of refunding in that district with averages for all non-
rated districts is of interest. The saving to the District per $1,000 
par value of refunding bonds exceeds the average for all non-rated 
districts in all three categories shown (Table VI); and, if the 
alternative proposal discussed elsewhere in this report had been accept-
ed, the disparities would have been far greater. Gross income from 
underwriting for Rangely is comparatively large, but this is necessarily 
so to offset the large escrow loss which resulted from the fact that 
the interest rate on the refunded bonds was high. Income to the bond 
houses per $1,000 par value of the refunding bonds is smaller for 
Rangely, both in takedowns and concessions and in profit from under-
writing (before overhead), than it is for the non-rated group as a 
whole. The combined income to the Colorado Account (before overhead) 
per $1~000 of par value is $19.18 for the Rangely refunding, whereas 
the average for all non-rated districts is $24.06 (Table VIJ. 
Table VI 
RESULTS OF THE RANGELY REFUNDING COMPARED WITH THE NON-RATED 
SCHOOL DISTRICT AVERAGES DURING THE COLORADO ACCOUNT PERIOD 
(Dollars per $.1 ,000 Par Value of the Refunding Bonds) 
Classification 
Saving to the School Districts 
Principal and Interest 
One Per Cent Treasurer's Fee 
Total Saving 
Gross Income from Underwriting 
Takedowns and Concessions to Selling Dealers 
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Rangely 
$49.09 
11.46 
60.54 
69.76 
9.39 
Non-Rated 
Average 
$41.14 
10.10 
51.24 
45.40 
12.14 
Classification 
Table VI 
(continued) 
Expenses of Refunding Including Escrow Loss 
Profit from Underwriting (Before Overhead) 
Total Takedowns & Concessions and Profit from 
Underwriting (Before Overhead) 
Rangely 
$50.58 
9.79 
19.18 
Non-Rated 
Average 
$21. 34 
11.94 
24.06 
Statutory Provisions and Practices with Respect to the Sale and 
Advance Refunding of School Bonds in States of the United States 
Letters were sent to the "chief State School Officers" in the 
forty-nine states of the United States exclusive of Colorado request-
ing information on the permissibility of advance refunding and on 
legislative provisions governing or practices pertaining to the sale 
of school bonds in their respective states. Facts presented in forty-
five replies to these letters are summarized below.4 
Method of Selling Original Issue School Bonds 
Public sale of original issue school bonds is known to be 
required -- with exceptions in a number of instances -- in twenty-seven 
states and not to be required in twelve states (Table VII). Many of 
the exceptions are believed to be worthy of examination; they are 
described below largely in the words of the respective respondents. 
Delaware: Public bidding is required for bond issues, and the 
school building commission determines the bid to be accepted. 
4. In a number of instances there is failure, in these replies, to 
answer all of the questions; and in others, there is uncertainty as 
to the facts of the situation. Take the question as to whether 
advance refunding is permissible as an example. The Attorney 
General in North Dakota is quoted as saying that refunding is not 
included among the specified purposes of issue and that there are 
no court decisions dealing with it. In the letter from Nebraska 
it is stated that advance refunding is not specifically authorized, 
but that some legal authorities contend that it is permissible. A 
statement of similar import appears in the letter from Idaho. In 
other cases, with no specific statements of this nature, the wording 
of the letters would appear to leave uncertainty in the reader's 
mind on this point. From Hawaii comes a statement that issues 
confronting Hawaii are believed not to be pertinent or applicable 
to the situation in Colorado; and there are no answers to specific 
questions. 
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Florida: Public sale with competitive bids or auction for the 
bonds is required. However, if all bids for the bonds are rejected, 
the county school board may negotiate for the sale of the bonds at a 
price at least as advantageous as that represented by the best bid 
received. The respondent states that he has never heard of sale by 
auction in Florida and that the provision for negotiating a sale is 
rarely, if ever, used at the present time. 
Idaho: The sale of bonds is restricted to competitive bidding 
unless the school district accepts the bid of the Department of 
Investments. 
Iowa: Any or all bids may be rejected and sale may be 
advertised anew, or the bonds or any portion may thereafter be sold 
at private sale. In the case of private sale, the bonds shall ~e 
sold upon terms not less favorable to the public than the most 
favorable bid made at the last advertised sale. 
Michigan: Bonds totalling less than $10,000 may be sold at 
private sale. 
Minnefota: Exceptions to the public sale requirement are those 
obligations!) issued under a home rule charter or a law specifically 
authorizing a different method of sale, (2) payable wholly or partly 
from the proceeds of special assessment, (3) payable wholly from the 
income of revenue-producing conveniences when such obligations do not 
exceed $50,000, and (4) sold to any board, department, or agency·of 
the United States or of the State of Minnesota. 
Montana: The general practice is for the board of trustees of 
the school district issuing the bonds to receive sealed bids if any 
are presented at the time set for the sale of the bonds. Whether or 
not sealed bids have been received the school board then accepts 
auction bids which in some instances result in considerable competition 
between or among prospective purchasers of the bonds. 
New Jersey: Bonds may be sold at private sale, without giving 
notice of sale, if the total amount offered for sale is $10,000 or 
less, or if the sale is to the trustees of the teachers' pension or 
annuity fund, or to any board, body or official of the State authorized 
to purchase said bonds. In all other cases bonds shall be sold at 
public sale. 
New Mexico: Bonds must be sold on bids in a public sale unless 
bought by the State, a. practice that has not been in existence for some 
seven or eight years in New Mexico. 
New York: There are two instances when bonds need not be sold 
at public sale. One instance is when they are sold to the United 
States Government or to a pension fund or sinking fund of the issuer. 
The other case when they may be sold at a private sale is when the 
bonds issued are not in excess of $30,000. 
North Dakota; The prescribed procedure relative to calling 
for bids upon the sale of municipal bonds shall not be required in 
case bonds are sold to the state board of university and school lands 
or to the Bank of North Dakota nor in case other trust funds admin-
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istered by public officials are invested in them, or they are sold 
to the United States of America, or any agency or instrumentality 
thereof. 
Ohio: Before selling any notes or bonds of a subdivision, 
the taxing authority shall offer such notes or bonds at par and 
accrued interest to the trustees, commissioners, or other officers 
who have charge of the sinking fund of the subdivision, and su~h officers 
shall have the option of purchasing said notes or bonds or rejecting 
them. If this offer is rejected, then notes having a maturity of one 
year or less may be sold at private sale at not less than par and 
accrued interest, and all bonds and notes having a maturity of more 
than one year shall be sold to the highest bidder, after being adver-
tised once a week for three consecutive weeks on the same day of the 
week. 
Vermont: The provision that bonds must be sold by competitive 
bidding is qualified by the statement that, if there are no bids on 
the issue, the legislative branch may sell the bonds at private 
sale at not less than par and accrued interest. 
Wyoming: The provision requiring public sale with competitive 
bidding is qualified by the statement that the school trustees are 
authorized to reject any bids and to sell the bonds at private sale, 
if they deem it for the best interests of the district. 
Of those who answered the question as to which method of sale 
public or by negotiation -- of original issue school bonds was consider-
ed preferable, the large majority indicated that they considered public 
sale preferable. However, of the forty-five reporting states, only 
fourteen indicated a preference; and three of those gave the answer 
"yes." with the proviso that the bond issues are large. 
Advance Refunding of School Bonds 
Twelve of the states are known to have provisions for the 
advance refunding of school bonds and twenty-one are known not to 
have such provisions. In only eight of these states is it known that 
advance refunding of school bonds has actually taken place. 
Seven of the twelve states reporting provisions for advance 
refunding of school bonds require public sale of the refunding bonds. 
In one of these instances the respondent says that all bids may be 
rejected, whereupon the county school board may negotiate for the sale 
of the bonds at a price at least as advantageous as that represented 
by the best bid received. In another instance -- Minnesota -- the 
exceptions noted above to the public sale requirement for original 
issue bonds apply to refunding bonds as well. Four of the respondents 
report that public sale of the refunding bonds is not required. 
It appears that five and possibly six of the states have laws 
permitting advance refunding of advance refunding school or other 
bonds (i.e. more than one advance refunding); but there is no 
information available to the Legislative Council staff, from this 
study or from any other source, indi~ating that advance refunding of 
advance refunding school bonds has actually occurred. 
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Alaska and Tennessee, in their prov1s1ons as to method of bond 
sales, distinguish between bonds of original issue and advance refund-
ing bonds. For bonds of origina~ issue, public sale is required; 
for advance refunding bonds, sale by negotiation is permitted. This 
distinction appears to reflect recognition of the fact that determin-
ation of what can and should be accomplished in a refunding operation 
requires far more expertise than is required when bonds of original 
issue are to be sold. In the latter case, many of the details such 
as total amount of the issue, schedule of redemptions and provision 
as to callability, and bond interest rates are commonly determined in 
advance of taking steps to sell the bonds. 
Under these circumstances -- with information on these details 
in hand and with knowledge of the current condition of the bond 
market and of the community backing the bonds -- the computations 
required on the part of bond companies to arrive at a reasonable 
bid are not extensive; and it is not unreasonable to expect carefully 
prepared bids from a number of bond houses. 
In contrast, it is clear from facts already presented on advance 
refunding (1) that the objectives of advance refunding are varied, 
(2) that the desires of the school board must be reflected in the 
planning of the refunding operation, and (3) that determination of 
what can be accomplished, consistent with the board's wishes, requires 
the expertise referred to above. Because school boards are generally 
not staffed to do the necessary analytical work, some means of 
collaboration of the board with an expert on the subject appears to 
be needed when advance refunding operations are being planned. This 
collaboration may conceivably be had from (1) negotiation as in the 
past, (2) a bond firm employed by the school district for a fee, 
(3) a private consultant, or (4) a fiscal agent in the employ of the 
state. 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arkansas 
Delaware 
Florida 
Idaho 
California 
Connecticut 
Kansas 
Table VII 
METHOD OF SALE OF ORIGINAL ISSUE SCHOOL BONDS 
A. States Known to Reguir5 Public Sale* 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
Ohio 
Oregon 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Maryland 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Montana 
North Carolina 
.North Dakota 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Vermont 
Washington 
B, States Known Not to Require Public Sale 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
New Hampshire 
Pennsylvania 
Texas 
Utah 
Virginia 
* Included in this group are several states which make exceptions, 
as noted elsewhere, to the public sale requirement. 
- 28 -
Notes Based Ugon "Public Sale Versus Negotiation 
In the Marketing of Municigal Bonds" 
The Investment Bankers Association of America issued a 
Statistical Bulletin (Occasional Paper No. 2) in September, 1962, on 
11 Public Sale Versus Negotiation in the Marketing of Municipal Bonds." 
Notes based upon this report -- reproduced verbatim in large part 
are presented below. 
Municipal bond sales in the United States in 1961, general 
obligations and revenues combined (as compiled by the IBA and revised 
to September, 1962) totalled $8,448 million. Those sold by the issuer 
by publicly inviting bids amounted to $7,312 million or 86.6% of the 
total; the remainder, $1,136 million, were sold through negotiation. 
Of the total bonds issued, $6,045 million were general obligation bonds; 
and $2,403 million were revenue bonds. 
Issuers of general obligation bonds used the public sale 
technique significantly more frequently than did issuers of revenue 
bonds. Of the general obligation total, 96.9% were sold this way, 
whereas only 60.6% of the revenue bonds were so marketed. 
This pattern for 1961 is essentially the same as it was in 
two previous years, 1957 and 1958. The tabulation follows: 
1957 
1958 
1961 
ISSUES SOLD THROUGH PUBLIC BIDS 
(Per Cent of Par Dollar Value) 
General 
Obligations 
94.4% 
95.3 
96.9 
Revenue 
65.3% 
72.9 
60.6 
In number of issues (instead of dollar volume) the proportion 
of general obligations sold at public sale in 1961 was 90.2% (instead 
of 96.9%); and for revenues it was 68.6% (instead of 60.6%). 
The reasons for the wide variance between general obligation 
issues as a group and revenue issues as a group, whether in terms of 
dollar volume or number of issues, are in part legal. A substantial 
number of states have laws requiring that general obligation issues 
be offered for bids. While some revenue bond acts have the same 
requirement, most do not. 
While legal factors no doubt are a major reason why general 
obligations as a group are sold at public bidding significantly more 
frequently than are revenues, they are not the only explanation. 
Successful public offering requires a "market name." Further, small 
issues are less likely than large issues to be rated and small issues 
usualy come from small issuers. In addition, certain costs of public 
offerings, such as the cost of advertising for bids, are relatively 
independent of the size of the offering. This alone may make 
negotiation with a local firm the least costly method for a very 
small issue, even if a public offering is possible. 
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In the case of general obligation issues, the 1961 results 
appear to be precisely in line with what one would expect from market 
and legal factors just discussed • .. 
In the case of revenue issues,· one further major factor enters. 
New issuers are formed to finance specific construction projects, 
which are often major undertakings -- toll roads, bridges, airports. 
Since these are not market names, the market must be cultivated both 
before and after the sale. Among other things, this requires con-
siderable consultation between the issuer and investment bankers in 
order to tailor the securities to the needs of both buyers and seller. 
Negotiation seems quite appropriate in these cases. 
Since there were a number of extremely large new construction 
facilities financed through revenue bond issues in 1961, the data on 
the revenue bond methods of sale for that year also appear consistent 
with relevant legal and market factors. 
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October 27, 1964 
Mr. Lyle C. Kyle, Director 
Legislative Council, Colorado General Assembly 
Room 341, State Capitol 
Denver, Colorado 
Re: Aspects of the Decision of Colorado Municipal Dealers to 
Syndicate General Obligation Advance Refunding Bond Issues 
Dear Mr. Kyle: 
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Refunding is a universally accepted and thoroughly tested aspect of long-term 
debt financing, employed in every state, and simply stated is the substitution of 
one bond issue for another, the proceeds of which are used to retire the outstand-
ing or refunded issue. (Multiple issues are commonplace, but for this discussion 
we will use only a singular issue). The advantages of refunding might be interest 
savings, debt realignment and revision of security provisions, as well as several 
other less important advantages. 
Advance refunding is refinement of this technique. Refunding bonds are issued· 
to ·replace existing indebtedness where such indebtedness is not callable for re-
demption at the time of the refunding. The proceeds of the refunding issue are in-
vested in United States Government securities, which, together with interest, are 
sufficient to pay when due or called the principal, interest and call premiums on the 
refunded debt. The advance refunding technique has been employed for nearly thirty 
years to effect refinancing to prevent default in some instances and to eliminate 
restrictive covenants which prohibited the issuance of additional debt in others. 
It has only been in recent years that advance refunding has been employed to effect 
large reduction in interest (and sometimes principal) requirements, as well as to 
achieve more liberal repayment provisions. Advance refunding has grown rapidly in 
the past five years and in 1963 bond issues sold to effect advance refundings 
amounted to approximately $600 million. 
The first major use of advance refunding in this area occurred in New Mexico 
for municipal issues of revenue bonds. Every major city of New Mexico has advance 
refunded its revenue debt, attesting to the acceptance and popularity of this pro-
cedure. It resulted in substantial saving to the issuers and allowed for the issu-
ance of additional bonds necessary to finance expansion of the utility systems. 
Boettcher and Company was a leader in the application of advance refunding 
techniques in New Mexico and after analyzing desirable ends achieved, studied the 
possibility of sponsoring legislation in Colorado to provide this same technique 
to refund general obligation issues of school districts. Study showed a substantial 
saving could accrue to the taxpayers, and.to implement this program, the following 
steps were taken: 
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Mr. Lyle C. Kyle 
October 27, 1964 
1. Dawson, Nagel, Shennan & Howard and Tallmadge & Tallmadge, recognized 
bond counsels, were employed to prepare legislation to provide for 
advance refunding. 
2. Members of the Colorado State Legislature were contacted and the 
desirable goals to be achieved by such legislation were explained. 
3. Many school districts were contacted, several of which granted 
"study contracts" and helped support the necessary legislation. 
To compensate for expense and effort, the study contracts provided that 
Boettcher and Company would be given an opportunity to purchase refunding issues 
resulting from this program, but the school districts retained the right to reject 
any proposal submitted and negotiate with other interested parties at a later date, 
or to reject the proposal in its entirety. 
Boettcher and Company contacted school districts prior to the introduction of 
legislation and obtained "Study Contracts" to analyze the refunding of approximately 
$60 million of outstanding bonds. At this point, no other municipal dealer was in-
volved in our efforts. As school districts were contacted concerning the proposed 
study contracts, other municipal dealers became aware of the effort and contacted 
Boettcher and Company to detennine the procedures to implement advance refunding 
made possible by passage of the enabling legislation. All school districts we·re 
potential candidates for refunding and because of the potential volume and the 
limited staff of Boettcher and Company, other dealers were invited to assist in this 
effort and to lend support for the proposed legislation. Subsequently when each 
municipal underwriter joined in this effort, each was allocated a proportionate in-
terest and did not share in any contracts taken prior to that date. 
In late October of 1962, joint account arrangements with other municipal under-
writers had been made by Boettcher and Company covering perhaps forty issues; these 
arrangements varied from issue to issue and involved most municipal underwriters in 
Denver. Some underwriters had a financial interest in only a portion of the "Study 
Contracts" obtained and that interest depended on the specific allocations made at 
the time the joint effort was decided. 
Colorado school financing has an approximate annual volume, excluding Denver 
School District No. 1, of $35 million per year under normal conditions. It was 
evident that, with the anticipated refunding volume of perhaps $100 million in 
addition to the normal new financing, the underwriters were faced with'a serious 
problem of distributing this enormous increase in Colorado school general obligation 
issues to banks, insurance companies, trust accounts and individuals who had pur-
chased these issues in the past. This problem indicated the need for the new issues 
moving to the market at a controlled pace, depending upon market conditions, to allow 
the market to absorb this volume without a serious adjustment in interest rates. 
With "Study Contracts" already obtained involving about twenty-five issuers totaling 
approximately $100 million of bonds, the mormal market for Colorado municipal obli-
gations would be hard pressed, if not completely overwhelmed, by the tremendous 
volume that would be offered in a relatively short period of time without control. 
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Timing of underwriting the refunding issues was necessary to maintain interest 
rates at realistic levels and as a consequence, the "Study Contracts" already ob-
tained by each underwriter were contributed to a conmon pool with percentage in-
terests as follows: 
Boettcher and Company 
Bosworth, Sullivan & Company 
Coughlin and Company, Inc. 
Hanifen, Imhoff & Samford, Inc. 
Kirchner and Company 
Stern Brothers and Company 
Ranson and Company 
George K. Baum and Company, Inc. 
Francis I. duPont and Company 
Hornblower and Weeks 
Goodbody and Company 
J. K. Mullen Investment Company 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 
Quinn and Company 
18.2% 
9.6% 
9.6% 
· 9.6% 
8.1% 
8.1% 
6.0% 
5.0% 
4.6% 
4.6% 
4.6% 
4. 0% 
4.0% 
4.0% 
100.0% 
These percentages were agreed to in March 1963, and although the percentages indi-
cated varied slightly from the original agreement, these variations were due to some 
underwriters discontinuing their municipal activity in the State of Colorado. Per-
centage interest of each participant was determined after negotiation among the 
parties concerned and primarily rested on the following factors: 
1. Financial status and underwriting ability. 
2. The ability of the firm to distribute municipal obligations to ultimate 
purchasers. 
3. The number of "Study Contracts" obtained by the respective members at the 
time of this agreement. 
4. The ability of the individual firms to contribute personnel to the job of 
calculating the many factors involved in the consummation of any refunding 
program. 
In addition to the necessity for a common effort in underwriting the anticipated 
volume, substantial out-of-pocket expenses had been incurred, i.e. legal, travel, etc. 
which had to be shared by the underwriting firms and some method was necessary to 
determine each member's share of these expenses which were in fact defrayed on the 
basis of the percentage interests indicated above. It might be pointed out here that 
at the time it.was decided to combine efforts, Boettcher and Company's interest was 
determined at 18.2%, which percentage of the total was far less than the amount of 
the ''Study Contracts" already obtained by Boettcher and Company. Boettcher and 
Company's willingness to join this conunon effort was necessitated by a volume of fi-
nancing which they individually would have been unable to underwrite and distribute 
successfully without the necessity of exce~sively high interest rates and a corres-
ponding reduction in the saving to Colorado school districts. 
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Upon the successful passage of the proposed legislation, the Colorado dealers 
involved nominated Boettcher and Company as manager of the group with duties to 
arrange for the purchase of the refunded issue and the sale of this issue to the 
ultimate purchaser through the underwriting group ~hich had already been organized. 
In addition, Boettcher Investment Co., Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Boettcher 
and Company, arranged for the purchase and the financing of the government obli-
gations necessary to effect any refunding program. For these services, Boettcher 
Investment Co., Inc. was paid $1.25 (1/8 of 1%) per $1,000 of government bonds pur-
chased for the benefit of this group. This fee was paid by all members in proportion 
to their interest in the account. At one time, Boettcher Investment Co., Inc. either 
owned or was committed to purchase government obligations with a market value of 
approximately $50 million. Such commitments require substantial capital, willingness 
to assume risk to assure some chance of profit. Boettcher and Company was assisted 
in the management decisions by Coughlin and Company and Stern Brothers & Company. 
These management decisions concerned primarily determining the price levels for the 
refunding issues and when the issues were to be offered for sale by the account. 
As stated previously, the original agreement which activated this group in the 
underwriting of advance refunding issues was agreed to in March 1963 and that original 
agreement provided the account would disband in March 1964 since it was felt that the 
initial heavy volume of advance refunding would have been achieved by that date and 
that subsequent thereto, a more nonnal volume of financing would occur and not·require 
a concerted effort of the entire group of underwriters. The account was formed only 
for general obligation advance refunding issues and did not extend to new money issues, 
revenue issues, special obligations issued by the State of Colorado or any political 
subdivisions. The account was limited to one activity only--general obligation advancl· 
refunding bonds; that account was made for a predetermined period of time, namely 
one year. There was no attempt on the part of the underwriters to conceal the fact 
that such an account existed. In fact, it was frequently emphasized to issuers. In 
no instances were out-of-state underwriters asked to participate in this program when 
such dealers evidenced an interest in Colorado refundings. It was the consensus of 
opinion of the Colorado group that the purchase of advance refunded issues by a 
dealer located outside this market would undoubtedly be sold outside this area and 
hence would present no difficulty insofar as the scheduling of issues coming to market 
was concerned. 
During the 1964 legislative session, various amendments were proposed concerning 
the existing legislation on advance refunding and these amendments led to considerable 
misunderstandings about the whole advance refunding program. The 1964 Legislature 
asked the Legislative Council, Committee on Education, to analyze the subject 
thoroughly and at that time, Colorado underwriters indicated their wholehearted support 
and cooperation to the Coamittee. Mr. Lyle Kyle and Dr. Fitzhugh Carmichael have had 
free access to our records to assist them in the preparation of reports you have re-
ceived, Advance refunding is a specialized technique which requires a consideration 
of not only the outstanding issues, but the cost of government obligations used to 
retire the outstanding issue and the market acceptance of any proposed new issue, 
Relative savings to the issuer is dependent on a combination of all three factors and 
hence the comparison of any two refundings is almost meaningless. 
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Boettcher and Company's pursuit of legislation to allow advance refundings 
has resulted in $6.3 million savings to Colorado taxpayers (a sununation of this 
amount has been provided to the Legislative Council). The advance refunding con-
cept was conceived as a method of reducing debt payment requirements, thereby 
offering a great value to the taxpayers. Such a service on an efficient basis 
was motivated by our desire to make a profit. The Legislative Council study will 
indicate that such a service was rendered and profits accruing to underwriting 
dealers was in an amount which constituted defensible (and perhaps less than 
commensurate) return for services rendered and risks undertaken. 
Very truly yours, 
BOETTCHER AND COMPANY 
qi:/~c>Z-
Fred Wiesner 
FW/ 
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